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Even under newly revised federal enforcement policies issued in the summer and fall of 2011, 
Secure Communities continues to lead to the deportation of people who have no criminal 
convictions or who are themselves crime victims; people convicted of minor, non-violent crimes 
such as traffic offenses; and people with old convictions for crimes, but who are rehabilitated 
and pose no danger to their communities.   
 
Secure Communities authorizes the sharing of information between local and federal authorities 
for the stated purpose of identifying and deporting “criminal aliens.” Very soon after the 
program’s inception in 2008, however, localities began to report that the vast majority of people 
deported under the program were not violent criminals. The localities also pointed out that the 
program forced them to internalize significant costs, including (1) the financial costs of 
detaining people in local jails before they are transferred to ICE custody; (2) harm to community 
policing because of the fear that any contact with police—even by a crime victim or witness 
calling 911—could lead to deportation; and (3) harm to the families of people deported through 
the program, which frequently include children and other relatives who are United States 
citizens. In addition, reports indicate that Secure Communities has led to the increased use of 
racial profiling in policing. 
 
This white paper analyzes the contrast between the federal government’s representation of 
Secure Communities and the reality of the program’s implementation in Los Angeles County 
through interviews with individual immigrant detainees and available aggregate data. The 
interviews and data suggest that ICE’s failure to adhere to its own stated priorities is a feature 
rather than a reparable flaw of the program. The program has been constructed and 
implemented on the assumption that if an individual has any contact with law enforcement—
even if that contact stems from a traffic offense—that individual represents a threat to the 
community. ICE uses its stated criminal priorities as part of a rhetorical strategy to assuage the 
concerns of states and localities. In operation, however, ICE casts a wide net and offers little 
relief to worthy candidates for prosecutorial discretion; the vast majority of those deported 
through Secure Communities have merely had contact with local law enforcement and have not 
committed serious crimes.  
 
The use of local police to identify and deport people who have not been convicted of serious 
crimes is an essential—though generally unstated—feature of Secure Communities. We 
recommend that the County of Los Angeles protect itself from the deficiencies of the Secure 
Communities program by adopting an ordinance limiting its participation, following 








I. HISTORY OF SECURE COMMUNITIES 
 
A. Origin and Operation  
 
Secure Communities is a deportation program introduced by the Bush administration in 2008, 
and expanded under the Obama administration. For several decades before Secure 
Communities, local police officers checked the fingerprints of all arrested individuals against a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) database to determine if the individuals had outstanding 
warrants in other jurisdictions. Under Secure Communities, however, the FBI sends those 
fingerprints to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), part of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). If ICE believes that the individual is undocumented or otherwise 
deportable, or if ICE wishes to initiate an investigation into the individual’s deportability, it 
issues a “detainer” to the local police department. These detainers—also referred to as 
“immigration holds” or “ICE holds”—request that local police continue to detain the individual 
until ICE agents interview and determine whether or not to transfer the individual to ICE 
custody. ICE issues the detainer at the time of the individual’s arrest; no past or current 
conviction is required for ICE to issue a detainer. According to ICE, the purpose of this 
additional detention is to allow ICE agents to interview the individual.  
 
In theory, these detainers should last no longer than 48 hours, in addition to any weekends and 
holidays, though in practice detainers may last much longer.1 Even if the detainer lasts 48 hours 
or less, however, people with a detainer tend to stay in jail much longer than similarly situated 
people without a detainer.2 This is because police often refuse to accept bail from people who 
have ICE detainers, and because people with detainers are often denied access to alternative-to-
incarceration programs. Local jurisdictions bear the cost of the prolonged detention, whether it 
is a result of a detainer or a prolonged jail stay.   
 
B. ICE’s Stated Priorities 
 
ICE has always stated that the purpose of Secure Communities is to remove “criminal aliens,” 
though it never defined in precise terms who should be designated as such. In 2009, 
emphasizing that “criminal aliens pose a threat to security in our communities,” ICE described 
the program as an “ICE initiative that focuses on the identification and removal of aliens who 
are convicted of a serious criminal offense and are subject to removal.”3 In other words, ICE 
framed Secure Communities as a tool to help the agency identify non-citizens previously 
convicted of serious crimes, and who therefore threaten the safety of their communities. 
 
However, ICE has broadened its net to include those merely charged with—and never convicted 
of—its target criminal offenses. This change is clear in ICE’s monthly statistics reports, which 
lump together people “charged with or convicted of” various categories of offenses.4 The 
distinction between these two categories of people is crucial; ICE counts people who have been 
convicted of crimes in the same group as people who have merely faced charges in the past—
even if those charges were dropped because the police or prosecutor no longer believed the 
individual was responsible. This categorization highlights the reality that Secure Communities 




punishes with deportation both those who are convicted of crimes and those against whom 
charges have been dropped.   
 
C. Implementation  
 
ICE piloted Secure Communities in October 2008 in 14 jurisdictions. As ICE sought state 
partners, it made clear that implementation of Secure Communities at the local level required 
two steps: (1) execution of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the state; and (2) signed 
statements of intent from county and local agencies.5   
 
ICE’s MOA template explained that it was the program’s goal to “identify, detain and remove 
aliens convicted of a serious criminal offense,” thus “improving community safety.” The MOA 
would remain in effect only “until terminated by either party.”6 With those assurances, many 
states entered into MOAs to implement the program.  
 
ICE moved quickly to spread Secure Communities across the country in a relatively short period 
of time. California signed an MOA authorizing the implementation of the program on April 10, 
2009, and the program was implemented in Los Angeles on August 27, 2009. As of November 
15, 2011, Secure Communities had extended into 1,688 jurisdictions in 44 states and territories. 
ICE now states that it plans to implement the program nationwide by 2013.7   
 
D. Local Pushback 
 
As Secure Communities spread, it became clear that the vast majority of those deported through 
the program were not violent criminals, and often had no criminal convictions at all. At the same 
time, ICE began “activating” the program in local jurisdictions without first obtaining signed 
statements of intent from counties and localities, violating a premise on which many states had 
entered into MOAs. A number of states and localities complained that the reality of the 
program’s implementation did not match its stated goals, and that they were being forced into a 
controversial program without their consent.  
 
Several localities—including Arlington, Santa Clara, San Francisco, and others—sought to opt 
out of the program, requesting information on how to do so from DHS. On September 7, 2010, 
DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano clarified in a letter to Representative Zoe Lofgren that even 
after a state enters into an MOA to implement Secure Communities, local law enforcement 
agencies could opt out of the program simply by formally notifying ICE of that intent.8 A 
corresponding section on the ICE website spelled out those instructions in greater detail: 
 
If a jurisdiction does not wish to activate on its scheduled date in the Secure Communities 
deployment plan, it must formally notify its state identification bureau and ICE in writing (email, 
letter or facsimile). Upon receipt of that information, ICE will request a meeting with federal 
partners, the jurisdiction, and the state to discuss any issues and come to a resolution, which may 
include adjusting the jurisdiction’s activation date in or removing the jurisdiction from the 
deployment plan.9 
 




Following that representation, the County of Santa Clara Board of Supervisors unanimously 
voted on September 28, 2010, to opt out of Secure Communities. In explaining his vote, 
Chairperson George Shirakawa stated, “this program does not make any community in our 
County safer, because it creates fear among our residents and prevents them from reporting 
crime.”10  
 
On that same day, the County of Arlington, Virginia, passed a similar resolution opting out of 
Secure Communities. The resolution stated that “public safety depends on the ability of 
[Arlington County] residents to interact with . . . local law enforcement authorities without fear 
due to actual or perceived race, national origin, ethnicity, or immigration status.”11 
 
ICE responded by removing the “opt-out” instructions from its website at some point in October 
2010. Secretary Napolitano then began to contradict her earlier representation, stating that “we 
do not view this as an opt-in, opt-out program.”12  
 
Nevertheless, on May 3, 2011 the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department issued a memorandum 
announcing a policy that would implement that city’s Sanctuary City ordinance with respect to 
Secure Communities, beginning the following month. The memorandum stated that ICE 
detainer requests are merely requests, and do not impose a legal mandate to hold a person in 
custody. As a result, the Sheriff’s Department would honor the detainer requests only in limited 
circumstances, focusing on individuals with convictions for a limited set of crimes.13  
 
On May 4, 2011, the Illinois State Police formally terminated its memorandum of understanding 
with ICE implementing Secure Communities in Illinois. That agreement had been in effect since 
November 2009. In his letter to Marc Rapp, Acting Assistant Director of Secure Communities, 
Illinois Governor Pat Quinn cited statistics that less than 20 percent of those deported from 
Illinois under the program had ever been convicted of a serious crime, and more than 30 
percent had never been convicted of any crime. Governor Quinn concluded that Illinois would 
no longer participate in the program because of “the conflict between the stated purpose of 
Secure Communities and the implementation of the program.”14 
 
The next day, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus sent a letter to President Obama requesting 
“an immediate freeze” of Secure Communities pending a thorough review of the program. The 
letter cited national statistics that “79 percent of individuals deported through S-Comm either 
lacked any criminal record or have been convicted of only minor offenses, including traffic 
violations.” The letter also expressed concern that the program had led to racial profiling, as 
evidenced by the fact that “rates of non-criminal deportations appear to vary widely between 
jurisdictions.”15   
 
On May 26, 2011, the California Assembly passed the TRUST Act by a 47 to 26 vote, sending that 
bill to the Senate for consideration.16 The TRUST Act would have modified California’s Secure 
Communities MOA by requiring that communities wishing to participate in the program “opt in” 
with a vote by the local political body, and would also have prohibited the pre-conviction sharing 




of fingerprints.17 Lawmakers are currently revising that act following DHS’s August 2011 
cancellation of all Secure Communities MOAs.  
 
On June 1, 2011, New York State suspended its participation in Secure Communities. In a letter 
explaining that decision, Mylan Denerstein, Counsel to Governor Andrew Cuomo, stated that 
the program was “compromising public safety by deterring witnesses to crime and others from 
working with law enforcement.”18   
 
On June 3, 2011, Massachusetts indicated its intent not to enter into a memorandum of 
agreement with ICE to participate in Secure Communities. In its letter indicating that intent, the 
state focused on the conflict between the program’s stated goal of identifying and removing 
“aliens who are convicted of a serious criminal offense and are subject to removal,” and the 
reality of the program’s implementation. The letter stated that “only about 1 in 4 of those 
deported since the inception of Boston’s pilot participation in Secure Communities were 
convicted of a serious crime and more than half of those deported were identified as ‘non 
criminal.’”19 
 
On June 7, 2011, the Los Angeles City Council voted 11 to 1 to support state legislation that 
would limit participation with Secure Communities. The City Council resolution pointed to the 
increasing number of localities choosing to opt out of the program, the program’s financial and 
social costs, its “direct contradiction” with LAPD policy, and the “concern that the Secure 
Communities program has been deployed without adequate notice and without [localities’] 
consultation or consent.”20   
 
On September 7, 2011, Cook County, Illinois passed an ordinance requiring that the Sheriff of 
Cook County “decline ICE detainer requests unless there is a written agreement with the federal 
government by which all costs incurred by Cook County in complying with the ICE detainer shall 
be reimbursed.” The ordinance further bars county officials from giving ICE agents access to 
individuals in county facilities unless county officials have a “legitimate law enforcement 
purpose that is not related to the enforcement of immigration laws.”21   
 
On October 18, 2011, Santa Clara County passed a second resolution related to Secure 
Communities, this one focused on ICE detainer requests. The resolution forbids the honoring of 
all detainer requests until “there is a prior written agreement with the federal government by 
which all costs incurred by the County in complying with the ICE detainer shall be reimbursed.” 
Even where there is such an agreement, the resolution authorizes law enforcement officials to 
honor those requests only when the individual has been “convicted of a serious or violent felony 
offense for which he or she is currently in custody,” or “has been convicted of a serious or violent 
felony within 10 years of the request, or was released after having served a sentence for a serious 
or violent felony within 5 years of the request, whichever is later.” The resolution also forbids 
County officials from honoring ICE detainer requests to individuals younger than 18 years of 
age, and forbids County officials from giving ICE agents access to County facilities without “a 
legitimate law enforcement purpose that is not related to the enforcement of immigration 
laws.”22 





On October 19, 2011, Mayor Gray of Washington, D.C., signed an executive order limiting that 
city’s police and public safety officials from complying with ICE detainer requests.23 The 
following month, all 13 D.C. Council members co-sponsored a bill to restrict ICE detainers to 24 
hours, rather than the presumptive 48 hours.24    
 
On November 22, 2011, New York City Mayor Bloomberg signed legislation limiting the use of 
New York Police Department resources to honor ICE detainers except in narrow 
circumstances.25 The legislation specifically found that “more than 50% of the inmates in 
[Department of Corrections] custody with immigration detainers had no prior convictions at 
all.”26 
 
On December 1, 2011, Los Angeles Mayor Villaraigosa wrote a letter to California Governor Jerry 
Brown urging him to suspend California’s participation with Secure Communities. Mayor 
Villaraigosa’s letter expressed concern about the community costs of “entangling agencies like 
the LAPD in immigration enforcement.” The letter also pointed to deportations of “community 
members with no criminal background,” with the result that “thousands of US citizen children 
have been placed in foster care due to their parents’ deportations.” Finally, Mayor Villaraigosa 
lamented what he saw as ICE’s failure to proceed “in an open, transparent manner” by 
implementing—and then rescinding—California’s Memorandum of Agreement activating the 
program, and by using the program to deport people “who pose no discernible threat to public 
safety.”27   
 
On December 14, 2011, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a resolution supporting 
the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department and Juvenile Probation Department policy restricting 
use of local funds for ICE detainers.28 Explaining his vote, Supervisor Eric Mar, author of the 
resolution, stated that the program “doesn’t make communities safer.”29  
 
Most recently, on December 16, 2011, Los Angeles area Congressional Representatives Judy 
Chu, Laura Richardson, Xavier Becerra, and Lucille Roybal-Allard wrote a letter to the Los 
Angeles City Council and Board of Supervisors, urging them to “immediately adopt a policy 
which would mitigate the impact of [Secure Communities] on public safety and the rights of 
[their] California constituents.” The letter focused on what the representatives saw as a “wedge” 
that the program drives “between Los Angeles law enforcement and immigrant communities,” 
and on the illegal detention of native born Americans in Los Angeles County. The 
representatives stressed that “ICE has made clear that immigration detainers are voluntary 
requests” that a locality need not honor.30 
 
E. ICE’s Response  
 
In response to growing national pressure, ICE began a publicity campaign focused on 
prosecutorial discretion. All law enforcement agencies engage in some form of prosecutorial 
discretion by focusing their enforcement resources on certain individuals rather than others. In 
a memorandum dated March 2, 2011, ICE Director John Morton stated that because the agency 




“only has resources to remove approximately 400,000 aliens per year, less than 4 percent of the 
estimated illegal alien population in the United States,” it should prioritize the deportation of 
certain types of immigrants. In descending order of priority, the memo emphasized the 
deportation of (1) “aliens who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety,” (2) 
“recent illegal entrants,” and (3) “fugitive aliens” who are “subject to a final order of removal and 
abscond, fail to deport, or intentionally obstruct immigration controls.”31   
 
Despite the publicity surrounding the memo, ICE continued to push for the deportation of 
people who did not fit into those enforcement priorities. Isaura Garcia’s case provided a 
particularly poignant example. In early May 2011, Ms. Garcia called 911 to seek the LAPD’s help 
while she was being assaulted by her boyfriend. Due to confusion at the scene, LAPD officers 
arrested her and took her fingerprints. Because of Secure Communities, Ms. Garcia’s 
fingerprints were run through federal immigration databases, and ICE placed her in deportation 
proceedings. ICE did not suspend those proceedings until after national media reported on the 
case.32  
 
In May 2011, DHS announced that the Office of the Inspector General would investigate Secure 
Communities for allegations of racial profiling and selective enforcement.33  
 
On June 17, 2011, ICE Director Morton issued another memorandum on prosecutorial 
discretion, again stating that ICE agents should prioritize the deportation of individuals who 
pose a threat to national security, convicted criminals, and repeat immigration offenders. This 
memo stated in greater detail what factors ICE agents should weigh when determining whether 
to exercise discretion.34   
 
States and localities complained that the new memoranda did not appear to be implemented on 
the ground, and several states cancelled their MOAs with ICE. ICE responded on August 5, 2011, 
by terminating all 40 MOAs it had executed with states up to that point, stating that the 
agreements were “not required to activate or operate Secure Communities,” and that the 
program would continue without agreements in place. This announcement directly contradicted 
earlier ICE assurances to states and localities.35   
 
On November 10, 2011, the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), a nonpartisan, 
not-for-profit organization, published a report analyzing implementation of the prosecutorial 
discretion memoranda. The report stated that “in the majority of offices ICE agents, trial 
attorneys and supervisors admitted that they had not implemented the memoranda and there 
had been no changes in policy or practice.”36   
 
On November 17, 2011, ICE announced that it would undertake a case-by-case review of most 
pending cases to determine whether or not they fit into ICE’s enforcement priorities.37 Any 
results of this review are, as of now, unclear.   
 
A recent report in the New York Times confirmed AILA’s suggestion that despite publicity 
surrounding the ICE policy announcements, ICE officers are largely rejecting the discretion that 




the new policies demand they apply. The report states that the national ICE officers union has 




II. CONTINUED ENFORCEMENT IN LOS ANGELES: THE 
HUMAN COST OF SECURE COMMUNITIES 
 
Despite growing controversy and significant questions about its implementation, effects, and 
costs, police departments and ICE continue to cooperate to implement Secure Communities 
across the City and County of Los Angeles. As described above, ICE has attempted to assure 
states and localities that the program will lead to minimal harm—first, by promising states and 
localities that the program was optional and then by publicizing its use of prosecutorial 
discretion. 
 
Interviews with Los Angeles County residents held in immigration detention facilities reveal the 
misplaced priorities of Secure Communities. The detainees we interviewed generally fell into the 
following categories: (1) Los Angeles County residents never convicted of any crimes, who are 
themselves victims of crimes, and who have been mistakenly identified as being convicted of 
crimes; (2) residents convicted of minor crimes such as traffic offenses; and (3) residents who 
have been rehabilitated and pose no threat to their communities.   
 
These categories are, unfortunately, more the rule than the exception. The National Immigrant 
Justice Center (NIJC) recently acquired immigration detainer data from ICE through a Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) request. The data shows that between October 1, 2008, and June 21, 
2010, ICE issued 14,771 detainer requests in Los Angeles County. Of these, only a small number 
were associated with any serious criminal charge. Interviews with immigrant detainees show 
that even in cases where a crime is listed, the immigrant may have exceptional circumstances or 
a history of rehabilitation which the data does not reveal. Moreover, over 8,000 of the detainers 
in the data set listed no criminal charge at all. Some of these may merely be omissions, but 
interviews with immigrant detainees suggest that a number of these cases may also be based on 
false matches, pretextual arrests, or other reasons misaligned with the stated priorities of Secure 
Communities.  
 
The interview summaries below serve to illuminate the human costs of Secure Communities. All 
names have been anonymized to protect the individuals, many of whom remain in detention 
facilities.  
 
A.  Non-criminals, crime victims, and cases of mistaken identity 
 
There has been significant publicity concerning the identification of crime victims and non-
criminals through Secure Communities. Though ICE has claimed that it is correcting that 
problem through prosecutorial discretion, recent interviews with detainees demonstrate that in 




Los Angeles County Secure Communities continues to identify crime victims and residents never 
convicted of any crime, leading to their detention and deportation. The program also appears to 
have a serious problem with false matches—cases of mistaken identity where an individual is 
mistaken for someone else with a criminal record. Recently, the ACLU of Southern California 
and other legal and advocacy organizations sent letters to the Los Angeles City Council39 and 
Board of Supervisors,40 highlighting instances of American citizens detained based on such false 
matches. Interviews with detainees reveal that non-citizen Los Angeles County residents are also 




TS has no convictions and is not facing any criminal charges. Nevertheless, LAPD officers placed 
him in ICE’s custody through Secure Communities, and he now faces deportation. 
 
TS has lived in the United States since he was three months old, when his parents brought him 
here in the mid-1980s. He is the eldest of six siblings; his four brothers and one sister are all US 
citizens. He grew up and went to school in South Central Los Angeles, passing his time playing 
soccer with friends. He graduated from high school and set his sights on college. When his 
parents developed costly medical problems, however, TS put off his college plans to help support 
his family. 
  
TS is now engaged to EC, a woman he began dating in high school and with whom he has 
remained together for most of the last 11 years. Like TS’s brothers and sister, EC is a US citizen. 
She works for a school, assisting children with learning disabilities. She and TS have a four-year-
old daughter, and the family regularly attends church near their home in Los Angeles. 
  
In July 2011, several LAPD officers were chasing someone with a gun near the family’s house. 
The fugitive ran through the house, and escaped out the side door. The LAPD officers stormed 
in, and—apparently believing TS was the suspect—placed him under arrest. TS was detained for 
a week in county jail before the police understood their error and dropped all charges. But TS 
then learned that ICE had put a “hold” on his release. TS found himself transferred to immigrant 
detention, far from his family, and placed in removal proceedings.  
  
TS had had no prior contact with ICE until August 2011 when he was placed in removal 
proceedings. Nevertheless, ICE agents repeatedly demanded that he sign a stipulated removal 
order that would fast-track his deportation.41 They told him that there was no way he would be 
able to bond out, and that he would surely be deported. TS refused.  
  
On last contact with TS, he was still detained by ICE, hoping that the Immigration Judge would 











GK is a crime victim. He has been in the United States for 13 years, and has no criminal 
convictions. His arrest—a result of a language barrier with police officers—triggered an ICE 
detainer request through Secure Communities. After the LAPD continued to detain him without 
criminal charges, he was picked up by ICE and placed under their custody. 
 
GK entered the United States in 1998. In August 2011, he was invited to a birthday party. When 
he arrived at the house where he thought the birthday party would be held, someone hit him in 
the ribs with a metal pipe and covered his mouth with a drugged rag. When he awoke, he 
realized that his personal possessions had been stolen. Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived 
and began questioning him. The police did not speak Spanish and GK did not speak English, and 
the resulting confusion led to his arrest. After he was transferred to ICE custody, friends told GK 
that the muggers knew about his arrest and had proceeded to burglarize his apartment. 
 
GK originally came to the United States from Central America to flee a gang that killed his uncle 
in 1997. These same men threatened GK and shot at him on a deserted road before he fled in 
1998. Due to Secure Communities, GK has lost nearly all of his possessions and faces the 
likelihood that ICE will deport him to a country where he fears for his life. 
 
  iii. ME 
 
ME is a father of three children. He has been in the United States for 13 years. In October 2011, 
he lost his passport and identification. By November, he was in immigration detention and 
facing deportation wearing someone else’s name on the wristband all detainees must wear. 
 
ME works at a bar in Los Angeles. In November 2011, his boss was having a birthday celebration 
and asked ME to have quick drink with him before going home. At 4:30 AM, ME shared one 
drink with his boss and drove home. As he got on the freeway, a sheriff’s officer pulled him over. 
The officer smelled alcohol on his breath and took him to the station. 
 
ME arrived at the sheriff’s station at 5 AM. Sheriff’s officers told him that he would be released 
in five hours because his blood alcohol level was below the legal limit, and because it was his 
first arrest. ME called his wife and told her that he would be heading home by that afternoon. 
But by 8 PM, officers told ME that he was being detained because of an ICE hold.  
 
ME’s detention was a direct result of a false match through Secure Communities. ME shares a 
first and last name with a man from Texas with an outstanding warrant. However, ME has never 
been to Texas, nor does he share a maiden name with the man from Texas. Regardless, ICE 
officials interrogated ME at least six times over the next three days, and repeatedly pressured 
him to sign a voluntary departure form. ME explained to the officials that they were making a 
mistake and that he would gladly sign a voluntary departure form if the name on it were correct. 
The officers ignored him and sent him to a detention center. 
 




  iv. SL 
 
SL has lived in the United States for 11 years. He was stopped for a minor traffic violation. He 
was set to be released shortly after his arrest, but due to a mistaken fingerprint match through 
Secure Communities he is now in immigration detention waiting for his removal hearing. 
 
In November 2011, SL watched a boxing match with his friend. Afterwards, they went out to a 
nightclub together. SL made an improper left turn into the parking lot, and an LAPD officer 
pulled him over. The officer asked SL to take a breathalyzer test. When the machine showed he 
was below the legal limit, the officer asked SL to retake the test at the police station. SL agreed. 
 
LAPD officers told SL that he would be released in five hours. His blood alcohol level was low 
and this was his first arrest. A few hours later, however, LAPD officers told SL that he would be 
transferred to ICE custody because his fingerprint triggered an ICE hold.  
 
SL has never used false identification, and he does not recognize the name associated with his 
fingerprint. At the detention center his identification wristband contains the wrong identity 
information. On last contact, SL was waiting for his family to send him financial records and 
proof of residence so that he would not be deported under the wrong name.  
 
 
B. People convicted of minor, non-violent crimes such as traffic offenses 
 
In fiscal year 2011, only about 20 percent of individuals detained through Secure Communities 
were so-called “level 1” offenders—people charged with or convicted of more serious crimes.42 Of 
the rest, many were charged with or convicted of much less serious crimes, including non-
violent crimes and traffic offenses. The result of granting ICE detainer requests for such 
individuals is that people convicted of minor crimes, such as driving without a license, could 
face deportation.  
 
  i. GB 
 
GB is a high school student who was placed in removal proceedings after being convicted of 
traffic offenses.  
 
GB’s father was murdered when GB was a small child in Mexico. Because of his father’s debts, 
GB and his family had to move from place to place to avoid incurring violent reprisals from 
angry creditors. He began working to help support his mother and siblings when he was just 
eight years old. At age 11, his arm was badly mangled when it was sucked into a conveyor belt at 
the fruit processing facility at which he was working.  
 
At age 15, GB came to California to gain an education that would allow him to find a job that 
relied on his mind, rather than his arms. He taught himself English, and his grades steadily 
improved at his Los Angeles high school. He got a part-time job, and bought a car with the 




money. One day he took his friend for a ride. He sped, and ran through a red light. An LAPD 
officer pulled him over, and arrested him when he saw that GB had no license. GB was charged 
with driving without a license and other traffic offenses, and after pleading guilty to those 
charges, he expected to be released on parole. He was unaware that ICE had issued a detainer 
request to the LAPD through Secure Communities until ICE officers met him upon his release, 
brought him to an immigration detention center, and placed him in removal proceedings.   
 
 
C.    People who are rehabilitated, and are not a threat to their    
communities 
 
One stated purpose of Secure Communities is to protect public safety by facilitating the 
deportation of those who pose a danger to their communities. Many people deported through 
the program, however, have rehabilitated themselves and pose no danger to their communities. 
ICE’s insistence on deporting such people is evidence of its intent to use any police contact for 
the purposes of deportation, even when the individuals pose no threat.   
 
  i. CQ 
 
CQ has lived in the United States since 1983, and has been a Legal Permanent Resident since 
1993. Though he has now given up drinking alcohol, found religion, and began a new life, ICE 
has focused on his past mistakes and is moving to deport him. 
 
CQ has worked as a mechanic since 1989, using a large portion of his income to support his 
mother, who is a US citizen. He has five children with VG, who has remained his partner for 
many years. For much of his adult life, however, he struggled with alcohol addiction. As a 
consequence of this addiction, he was convicted of several substance-related crimes. He worked 
to better himself during his time in jail, eventually obtaining his GED as well as other 
educational certificates. After a relapse in 2005, CQ was convicted of a minor domestic violence 
charge. Feeling that his locale was a trigger for his alcoholism, CQ decided to move out of state; 
though he knew the move would violate his probation, he felt that he could beat his addiction 
only by changing his environment. 
 
In 2006, CQ moved to another state to live with his aunts and cousins. While there, he began to 
join his family at church. He soon committed his life to religion, completely swearing off alcohol. 
He has stayed true to his commitment and has had no alcohol since 2006. 
 
In 2010, CQ received word that his mother had become gravely ill. As her only son, CQ felt 
responsible to take care of her. He drove back to California, moved in with his mother, and 
began nursing her back to health. One day, while driving a friend’s car that he was fixing, he was 
pulled over for a broken tail light. When the arresting officer ran his fingerprints, CQ’s probation 
violation became apparent. Instead of paying the price for the probation violation, the LAPD 
kept him in custody under an immigration detainer until ICE officers transported him to a 
detention center. 





On last contact with CQ, he had been detained for a full year. His detention, separation from his 
ailing mother, and looming deportation have caused CQ to suffer from a severe depression, as 
well as various physical illnesses.   
 
  ii. JP 
 
JP is a father of five with a sixth child on the way. He has been in the United States for 12 years. 
JP has a single DUI conviction from 2007. In the years that followed he neglected to complete 
his required DUI rehabilitation program. As a result, a warrant was issued against him. In 
August of 2011 he was detained through Secure Communities. His arrest triggered an ICE hold 
and he was sent to immigration detention. 
 
JP arrived here in 1999. In the years that followed, he established his life in the United States. 
He began working in construction. He met and fell in love with MP. She had four children from 
a previous relationship, whom he has raised as his own. When he was transferred to ICE 
custody, JP and MP were expecting their second child together and planning their wedding. 
 
The children are bright and excel academically. With great pride, JP recounted that his oldest 
son had placed in the top three of a statewide mathematics competition for two years in a row. 
But he says that he does not have the children visit him at the detention center because he does 
not want them to see him in prison. 
 
JP's detention has caused his family great distress. He is the sole breadwinner for the family. His 
wife is pregnant and unable to work. But due to JP's detention through Secure Communities, 
they will not be able to pay rent and his family may need to move. 
 
  iii. BR 
 
BR is a father of five and a Legal Permanent Resident. He has been in the United States for 21 
years. Other than a single drug conviction, he has no criminal record. 
 
BR entered the United States in 1990. His mother filed a family visa petition on his behalf in 
1992. In the years after he entered the US, BR graduated from high school in Los Angeles. He 
began attending a church near downtown Los Angeles with his family. Eventually, he met his 
wife. She was a US citizen and, through their marriage, he became a legal permanent resident. 
 
In the years that followed, BR and his wife built a home together. They had five children. BR 
worked hard and never got in trouble with the law. Unfortunately, BR's wife developed a 
terminal illness in 2010 and passed away. All of BR's children began receiving psychological 
treatment at that time. He was arrested for possession of marijuana, which he was using to 
overcome his depression after the death of his wife. His arrest triggered an ICE hold through 
Secure Communities and he was sent to a detention center. 
 




Now, BR's children may be left without a father shortly after losing their mother. BR's mother 





III. COSTS TO LOS ANGELES 
 
Secure Communities exacts a heavy toll on Los Angeles, in addition to the costs imposed on 
individual immigrants. Compliance with the program is expensive for local law enforcement 
agencies, entailing increased booking costs, detention costs, and costs associated with 
compensating victims of civil rights violations. 
 
Compliance with Secure Communities also comes at a great cost to local communities. The 
deportation of immigrant parents leaves many US citizen children in foster care. Moreover, the 
increase in deportation rates through Secure Communities has had the unintended consequence 
of decreasing public safety: immigration duties drain police time and resources, and local 
immigration enforcement undermines police-community relationships and discourages crime 
reporting. 
 
A. Law Enforcement Costs 
 
Secure Communities strains city budgets and local communities. Most directly, local 
governments are forced to shoulder the burden of booking costs, immigration detainers, and the 
cost of compensating victims of civil rights violations through settlements and lawsuits. Perhaps 
the highest monetary costs to local governments come from ICE detainers. The Federal 
Government reimburses local governments for only a small fraction of detention costs. The 
Department of Justice’s State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) disburses grants to 
law enforcement agencies for costs of jailing “criminal aliens,” but only reimburses city, county, 
and state jails for certain types of inmates.43 SCAAP pays for inmates who are jailed for four or 
more consecutive days and have been convicted of a felony or second misdemeanor. Localities 
are responsible for the costs of jailing all other immigrants. As detailed above, Secure 
Communities leads to the detention of many immigrants never convicted of a felony or of 
multiple misdemeanors. 
 
Local participation in federal immigration programs also results in substantially higher costs for 
local jails and prisons. A recent letter from legal and advocacy organizations to the Los Angeles 
County Board of Supervisors regarding Secure Communities estimated that between October 1, 
2008, and June 21, 2010, Los Angeles County spent $60,138,078 to voluntarily detain people at 
ICE’s request.44 These figures were based on the ICE detention data acquired by NIJC and 
discussed above. 
 




Aside from the defined costs of arresting and detaining immigrants, local governments should 
also expect to shoulder the costs associated with compensating victims of civil rights violations 
that occur through the program. A detainer gives ICE a maximum of 48 hours to gain custody of 
an individual. ICE frequently fails to gain custody of the individual within 48 hours, however, 
leading to costly litigation. For example, in 2007 the City of New York settled a detention case 
for $145,000 after the plaintiff was held on an ICE hold for 35 days.45 More recently, 
Washington State settled a similar case for damages of $35,000.46  
 
The size of these settlements is significant given the program’s error rate. A recent study by the 
Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy at the University of California, 
Berkeley Law School found that Secure Communities has an error rate of 1.6 percent with 
respect to US citizens.47 At that rate, approximately 3,600 US citizens have been apprehended 
by ICE from the inception of the program through April 2011.48 The report does not have similar 
data on the error rate for detained non-citizens, although our interviews with detained 
immigrants indicate that many have been apprehended using incorrect identification 
information as well. Such cases might also lead to civil damages lawsuits. 
 
B. Community Costs 
 
When local law enforcement agencies cooperate with federal immigration officials, communities 
bear additional costs. Local governments must bear the burden of providing foster care for 
children whose parents are deported through Secure Communities. The Applied Research 
Center recently released a report entitled “Shattered Families” which sheds some light on the 
costs of local immigration enforcement to family unity and foster care systems.49 The report 
found that nationally at least 5,100 children currently live in foster care due to the deportation 
of their parents.50 Moreover, the report estimates that based on current detention and 
deportation rates, the number will grow by at least 15,000 in the next five years.51 
 
Communities also bear the costs of diverted law enforcement resources. Immigration duties 
drain police time and resources. For that reason, the Major Cities Chiefs Police Association 
(MCC) has come out against local immigration enforcement, stating that “[s]ince the creation of 
the Homeland Security Department, federal funding for major city police departments has been 
greatly reduced,” and “[l]ocal communities and agencies have even fewer resources to devote to 
such an effort than the federal government given all the numerous other demands on local 
police departments.”52  
 
In addition, local immigration enforcement undermines police-community relationships and 
discourages crime reporting. The International Police Chiefs Association issued a report in 2007 
stating that “law enforcement simply cannot function adequately without the support and 
cooperation of the populations it serves. An adequate law enforcement outreach and response to 
prevent fear, crime and disorder requires cooperation and understanding of all.”53 Secure 
Communities discourages immigrant communities from interacting with local police because of 
their fear of deportation. As former Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton stated in a 2009 
op-ed to the Los Angeles Times, “My officers can’t prevent or solve crimes if victims or witnesses 




are unwilling to talk to them because of the fear of being deported. . . . Criminals are the biggest 
benefactors when immigrants fear the police. We can’t solve crimes that aren’t reported because 
the victims are afraid to come forward to the police.”54 
 
Finally, reports indicate that Secure Communities increases the use of racial profiling by local 
police. In jurisdictions where an unusually high percentage of deportations under Secure 
Communities are of non-criminals, the numbers suggest that police may be arresting Latinos for 
pretextual reasons.55 One recent report produced by the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on 
Law and Policy at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law found that “Latinos 
comprise 93% of individuals arrested through Secure Communities though they only comprise 




IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Secure Communities appears to represent a choice to punish with deportation almost anyone 
who has had contact with law enforcement, without regard to the severe social and economic 
consequences of such a policy.  
 
ICE has failed to implement Secure Communities consistent with its stated purpose, at 
enormous costs to the City and County of Los Angeles. The program appears to represent ICE’s 
assumption that any contact immigrants have with law enforcement is evidence that they are a 
threat to the community. Thus, it is not surprising that the vast majority of those deported 
under the program are not dangerous criminals. The program was designed to bring into ICE 
custody all those who have contact with law enforcement regardless of the actual threat they 
may pose. This is an irreparable structural flaw in the program that cannot be corrected with 
remedies created for individual detainees, such as a telephonic hotline57 or prosecutorial 
discretion. While ICE presents Secure Communities as a benefit to community safety, in reality 
the program creates mistrust between communities and law enforcement, increases racial 
profiling in policing, and increases social harms when families are separated through 
deportation.  
 
Localities and states around the country have repeatedly complained of ICE’s 
misrepresentations concerning the program, as well as the costs and harms it places on them. 
Because of those concerns, some counties have recently passed ordinances limiting their 
participation in the program. On September 7, 2011, for example, Cook County passed an 
ordinance drastically limiting ICE’s access to detainees. On October 18, 2011, the Santa Clara 
County Board of Supervisors passed a similar resolution. Localities may pass such ordinances 
because detainer requests carry with them no legal duty that they be honored, a fact confirmed 
by federal courts, state and county counsel, and ICE officials themselves.58   
 




Given the documented costs to communities, families, and individuals, as well as ICE’s failure to 
accurately represent the program, we recommend that the County of Los Angeles act to limit its 
participation in Secure Communities.   
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